Civil War General Franz SIgel & the 1864 Battle of New Market

 

Photo from the Library of Congress

The year was 1864, and the Great American Civil War had gone on for four years too long. For four years, the Army of the Potomac had tried over five times to traverse the 95 miles to capture the Confederate Capital in Richmond, Virginia, and been repulsed just as many. On top of that, they still hadn’t even shut down the Shenandoah Valley as either a Confederate invasion route to the North, or as their bread basket. Trouble is, things never go well for the Union in the Valley. Progress was needed, and not the least because Abraham was up for election in November, and if there wasn’t enough progress, the Democrats just might sue for peace, so the South had reason to hope if they stalled long enough they could win, and thus the clock was ticking. So that end, the Federals’ newly-minted Supreme commander, Ulysses S. Grant, decreed the valley be cleared and burned, and to do so, stationed in West Virginia, Grant had the capable General George Crook equipped with 6,000 men, plus 2,000 cavalry. Nigh the valley's s northern mouth Grant also hadanother 9,000 men, but that just didn't matter very much, and that was because their commander (including Crook's) was the German-born General Franz Sigel, and Sigel was a terrible general. You see back when everyone was volunteering, he claimed he was an experienced military commander from Europe who fought three battles, which was true, but he also didn’t mention he lost every single engagement. He’d also tend to bark out orders in German, despite the fact his native-born American subordinates couldn’t follow, and it also didn’t help that his staff was largely German too with similar issues, compounding the language disconnect. Wherever he was, Sigel just kept making life difficult for his higher-up, making ridiculous demands, like arguing that all the German recruits should be serving under him. (Trust me, if the recruits knew his full battle record, they'd be committing mass mutiny in no time.) In any case, Sigel's finest moment in the Civil War came during the1862 Battle of Pea Rdge, where after he complained incessantly to the commanding Union General Samuel Curtis over being (wisely) relegated to the figurehead role of Second in Command, Curtis allowed him to ceremonially order the charge that cleared the forest of Confederates and won the day for the Union, which was sort of like a fireman father forced to babysit his ADHD little boy during an emergency run, and allows him to blow the siren just to give him something to do. Still, he was a great recruiter of German soldiers, so he wasn’t a complete douche; if just stuck to what he was good at, history would be a whole lot kinder towards him. Instead, once it had become clear he was a self-promoting incompetent, losing solo to Stonewall Jackson solo, and just mucking around ineptly, Sigel used his rapport with German Americans to force Lincoln to finally bestow on him the Department of West Virginia just to shut him up. Essentially, Sigel is just the perfect example of how Lincoln dealt with failed big-name commanders: Rather than fire them, Lincoln jsimply reassigned them to the periphery of the war zones, gambling that they wouldn’t have to rely on them somewhere down the road, so they wouldn’t cause any damage there, but still close enough that they could keep their names in the papers .Unfortunately, they would have to rely on them, and they did do damage. (I’m looking at you, Butler and Banks.) In any case, facing off against Crook and Sigel were a paltry 6.500 Confederates led by former Vice President and 1860presidential candidate, John C. Breckenridge. With a resume like that, and no formal military school, like Sigel could boast ol' Brecky was even more pure political general than his counterpart. Upon learning Crook and Sigel were invading, his first step was to gather his scattered forces, and his second was to mobilize more to supplement them wherever and however he could, which in his case meant activating the student body of the nearby Virginia Military Institute, the South’s version of West Point. By 1864 it is said the Confederacy was robbing the cradle and grave for soldiers, but in the case of the activated VMI Cadets, they were also depriving themselves of their future military leadership. The question remained to be seen: Would this stopgap measure of recruiting child soldiers be worth the sacrifice, both pragmatically and morally? As these schoolboys marched off to battle, however, only time would tell. (And me, of course.) As for the Union leadership, Grant , well aware of Sigel's track record, only asked Sigel to clear out the top of the valley, and then link up with Crook, who would clean out the bottom. Sigel could well have flanked Lee, but Grant knew better than to just ask the bare minimum of Sigel, and instead expected Crook to do the heavy lifting. And so, to get this campaign started, Crook sent his cavalry under William Averill to destroy some saltworks at a place called Saltville, naturally. Crook sent his cavalry under William Averill to destroy some saltworks at a place called Saltville, naturally. Unfortunately, after Crook burned a bridge near Dublin, Virginia, Crook then caught wind of an overly-optimistic report from an official Confederate dispatch claiming Grant lost the Battle of the Wilderness, and thus Crook decided to retreat. (Sigh.) Nothing ever goes right for the Union in the Valley. Just editorialize, Crook may have been a solid overall commander, but he just didn’t believe in Grant, and ultimately thought him like all his predecessora; only Sherman of all the commanders leading the armies Grant mobilized that spring trusted Grant implicitly, and as for Crook’s cavalry under Averill, which he sent on a raid, it lost to John Hunt Morgan at Wytheville, taking out the last remnants of Grant’s plans for not leaving this moron Sigel all to his lonesome. But let’s just see how this douche does, shall we? Well, moving down the Valley cautiously, just like someone who’s been repeatedly bullied and beaten by inferior forces probably ought, Sigel would fan out his cavalry before him, wait, and then march forward. His lieutenants may not have under stood him very well, but Sigel at least made clear he only wanted his battalions to obey, and their input was not to be encouraged. Understandably bracing for another savage beating, he stopped at Winchester rear the top of the Valley to stage a “mock” battle. The final, official result: “Killed none, wounded none, missing: the 34th Massachusetts infantry.” That’s right, folks: As a result, of all the confusion Sigel lost a whole regiment in only a wargame because he ordered them to advance in a skirmish line, and they just never came back because he never rescinded the order. Needless to say, morale was low. In any case, while Sigel was busy drilling his army to disgust, in any case his supply wagons were getting repeatedly ripped off by raiders, namely that famous partisan guerrilla, John S. Mosby, as well as by one John McNeill, who pulled off a minor coup when he pillaged a critical railway depot. In any case and as a result, Sigel was now forced to dispatch a 400-man escort for every single caravan after Mosby pilfered his personal supply train, whilst chasing after McNeil with another 500, and, to top it all off, Sigel’s every move along the valley floor was being reported to Breckenridge’s forces by Confederate signalmen atop the 2,300-foot Shenandoah peak. And as for Breckenridge? Well, he was still en route, rushing to concentrate his forces to face Sigel, and he only had 1,600 cavalrymen under one General John Imboden. Imboden’s orders were to impede Sigel’s progress, but if so, how? Well, Imboden decided that since Sigel moved only as far forward as his hooved patrols signaled it was safe, he’d make the most damage by assaulting his furthest-flung forces and delaying them as much as possible. Consequently, Imboden took the bulk of his men and went on the hunt, finding a Federal unit somewhere in the Allegheny Mountains, led by one Colonel Jacob Higgins, who was sent after McNeill; they were maybe disappointed, but still up for a fight. Of course, if you've been following along, you've probably already guessed just how this skirmish is gonna turn out. Spying only Imboden’s lead scouts, but not the whole body behind them, Higgins orders an immediate charge; the Confederates retreat into the gap to safety, and the Federals follow; let’s just say that was a mistake. Upon realizing they’d just entered a shooting gallery manned by riflemen perched above either side of the cliffs, they wound up retreating so fast they abandoned all their wagons as Imboden now gave chase to them. Remarkably, despite Higgins’s rout, Sigel made another push ahead, compelling Imboden to draw up in battle formation just outside of a little town called New Market, and what ensued was essentially a grudge match between two politically connected generals: Who would prove more competent? In any case, meantime, one the Federal’s advanced scouting parties, 1st New York, back from patrol, sees the Confederate wagon train gathered nigh New Market, and head for them, somehow thinking they’re friendly, despite them being in front of Sigel’s forces, instead of behind them (like I said: Nothing ever goes right for the Union in the Valley), and the rebels, spying these patsies, now charge them, cut off and outnumbered two to one; (Sigh.) If you’re starting to feel sorry for Sigel’s men, you’re not alone. And so, with Union forces running off in total route once again, with no sign of Crook anymore advancing, Breckenridge concentrated now all his forces on Sigel, thereby deciding the best defense is a good offense. In the meantime, Sigel takes around a third of his force, turning it into a a 2,350-man reconnaissance mission in order to guide to the way for the rest of his army, led by Colonel Augustus Moor. Moor, having no personal knowledge of what’s ahead himself, understandably requests scouts and there aren't any; he requests maps too, but is told there aren’t any of them, either. Bowing to reality, he just decides he’ll have to wing it as is, advancing 21 miles in seven hours to the outskirts of New Market, where Breckenridge’s lines are currently forming. Breckenridge tries to bait Moor into attacking, but Moor, for whatever else, isn’t stupid, and decides to wait for the rest of Sigel’s army, now in transit. Frustrated by Moor’s recalcitrance, Breckenridge tries harder to provoke him by shelling the stuffing out’ve him, but Moor simply stands his ground. Breckenridge then decides that if Moor will not attack he will, ordering his cavalry to burn the bridge behind Moor, cutting him off, but before that happens, the rest of Sigel’s cavalry, led by their chief, Brigadier general Julius Stahel, arrives. Stahel, outranking Moor, takes charge, and orders the Federals back to a stronger defensive position along Manor Hill and the pike road, flanked on either side by gun batteries. With his men on another hill whilst getting fired on from Manor Hill, Breckenridge orders his forces to swiftly charge down to the bottom between the two hills, pause there where enemy cannon can’t reach them, and then charge from there the rest of the way to the foe—including the Cadets from VMI. Sooo...how was their first taste of battle? Well, the boys didn’t get the order to hurry, though, and so they marched down the hill in parade form, resulting in their first—and mostly needless—casualties. By then, Sigel himself arrived on scene; ever the wuss, he naturally wanted to retreat, but Moor and Stahel talked him out of it. Meantime, the Confederates, rested and reformed, finally charged up from the bottom of Manor Hill; the regiment defending the center, the 123rd Ohio, crumbled well before the rebels even reached them. The rest of the line held, but rather than try and plug the hole, this was more than enough reason for Sigel to order a retreat north to a place called Bushong’s Hill in two lines. Of course. Somehow, despite his army outnumbering the enemy overall, Sigel’s functional combat line on Bushong's was outnumbered by three to two. For starters, his thin outer line—manned by the fainthearted 123rd Ohio—could be easily flanked on both ends but on top of that, this dummy somehow positioned his cavalry so that it couldn’t easily counterattack with an exposed flank to boot. Breckenridge charges again, now with the VMI boys in reserve; performing above expectation, the hapless 123rd Ohio fires off one volley before running like scared rabbits, forcing one regiment, the 18th Connecticut, and one gun battery led by Captain Albert Von Kleiser, to retreat too. As the Confederates were now grimly closing with the main line up ahead, one of Sigel’s reserve regiments, the 12th West Virginia panicked, firing a volley into the backs of the mainline. With friends like this, who needs enemies? Just sayin'. Meanwhile, the ever-ready Imboden and his opportunistic cavalry had quickly figured out about Sigel’s cavalry’s exposed left flank, and wisely decided to start exploiting it with an artillery barrage. The effect, to quote Imboden, was “magical.” Incredibly, despite all this ineptitude and setbacks, the Federals started to show real resilience. Their main line stalled the rebel charge once they came within musket range, and Stahel’s troopers actually managed to recover from their surprise bombardment. And so, for several minutes the two armies just faced off against each other, shooting away in quintessential Civil War style...yay. At this point, Von Kleiser’s repositioned battery managed to blast a hole in the center of the Confederate line, which, if not plugged, would open them to counterattack. Unable to maneuver, Breckenridge now has only one option. “Put in the cadets,” urges a staff officer. “They are only children,” replies Breckenridge, conscience revolting. “Will they hold?” Ol' Brecky then says, necessity reasserting itself. A few moments later, still feeling guilty Breckenridge makes the only choice he can. “Put the boys in, and may God forgive me the order,” says Breckenridge, defeated. And thus with a cheer the cadets from VMI surged forward, up Bushong’s Hill, and into his orchard. And with that the gap in the Confederate line was now closed, but even so, Breckenridge’s left, led by Brigadier General Gabriel Wharton, was still exposed, given his right, led by Brigadier John Echols, had stalled out several hundred yards to Wharton’s rear. And, despite being mis-positioned by Sigel, Stahel’s 1,000 troopers charged Echols’s 1,100 in infantry. Unfortunately for the troopers, Echols’s two regimental commanders knew just what to do. While one regiment wheeled its men inward to give off flanking fire on Stahel, the other regiment wheeled in the opposite direction, even as the men left in the former center of the line formed tight squares where they could now shoot in all directions, meaning Sigel’s cavalry was now charging into a death gallery with no exit. Oh, and Imboden was still blasting away the troopers with his cannon. And, on top of all this Breckenridge noticed their charge, and brought up more guns to blast them with, now meaning that Stahel’s men were now suffering an overlapping barrage. It's almost needless to mention, but all this was just too much for the men in blue; they decided to abort in midcharge, galloping for the rear instead. Finally, Sigel, probably probably hoping relive his best war moment back on Pea Ridge, decides to order an overall counterattack, probably like the one at Pea Ridge, but by now the Confederate line had stabilized, and Breckenridge’s redirected artillery was really bearing down. It also didn’t help that Sigel was now too excited, and was thus lapsing into German again. As for the (badly) coordinated counterattack itself, the 1st West Virginia moved out from the federal center before either regiment flanking it was ready; it made 100 yards forward before deciding this was pointless, and (reasonably) gave up. To their left, 54th Pennsylvania followed suit; only the tone-deaf 34th Massachusetts pressed onward, if only because guys literally didn’t know when to stop. As you can only too weel imagine, they took over 200 casualties in just a few minutes; that’s almost half the regiment’s strength. Amazingly, their insane singlemindedness actually managed to push one Confederate regiment, the 51st Virginia, backwards, until it was reinforced by the 26th Virginia. And then, the whole Confederate line just charged. No order, no nothing; they just collectively charged, driving all before it—including the stupidly stalwart 34th Massachusetts, but who’s laughing?In any event, it just suffered so much concentrated firepower that its color-bearer, who suffered a mortal wound, wound up getting shot three more times before he even hit the ground. But by this point and to noone's surprise Sigel’s army finally began to disintegrate; nothing ever goes right for the Union in the Valley, and let's just say that this day is mere par for the course. Yes, Sigel tried to rally them, but given no one could even understand him, this (fortunately) leaving the fate of his army in the hands of others. Competent, incompetent, who knows? For Sigel's men at this point, this was probably a mercy. The whole army might well have been destroyed and not just routed, save for one enterprising artillery captain named Henry DuPont, who strung out his two guns around 500 yards apart along the pike road; the front cannon would fire till almost overrun, and then retreat whilst the second in the rear provided cover for them and the retreating army until the front gun, now the rear gun, was repositioned, and thus the process repeated over and over across four critical miles, buying precious time. DuPont would recall in disgust: “I had to depend entirely on myself, and did not receive a single order, either directly or indirectly,” which as I think we've established, is probably a good thing, if Sigel is the one giving them. So just count yourself fortunate, DuPont; if you wanted a leader, a simple coin flip would be a better you were actually supposed to have. As for Breckenridge, he may have won, but his thoughts are still with the cadets, and rides over to congratulate them. “Well done men,” says the General, prior to riding off; casualties had claimed nigh a quarter of their number. Breckenridge then ordered Imboden’s cavalry to burn the bridge by Mount Jackson in Sigel’s rear destroy him, but…Earlier in the day, Sigel had ordered a couple regiments to go to Mount Jackson. He should have ordered them on to New Market to better concentrate his forces, but he just didn’t think of it. Hurrah for the law of averages, everyone; this turns out to be Sigel's best move of the day, and it was totally unintentional. In any case Sigel now fled north across the bridge, and didn’t even leave any guards to protect his rear, prepare the bridge for burning, or wait for DuPont, who's been doing all the heavy lifting by his lonesome. Instead, it was all up to DuPont himself to burn the bridge, once he got there, which he does, showing at least that meritocracy still exists. And thus once again Shenandoah Valley was saved due Confederate courage and Union incompetence, but as for Franz Sigel, I have but one question: How can any man be this stupid? He attended military school, was fighting an even more purely political general than himself, had a large numerical superiority, and yet all that still couldn’t keep him from losing to kids, in good portion. And thus ended Grant’s attempt to clear out the Shenandoah Valley using someone whose career lay with comedy, rather than the battlefield; it wouldn’t be Grant’s last, though...